Mul­ti­me­dia Con­tent Iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on Through Smart Meter Power Usage Pro­files

Ul­rich Gre­ve­ler, Den­nis Löhr, Ben­ja­min Jus­tus


Ab­stract

Ad­van­ced me­tering de­vices (smart me­ters) are being in­stal­led throug­hout elec­tric net­works in Ger­ma­ny (as well as in other parts of Eu­ro­pe and in the United Sta­tes). Un­for­t­u­n­a­te­ly, smart me­ters are able to be­co­me sur­veil­lan­ce de­vices that mo­ni­tor the be­ha­vi­or of the cust­o­m­ers. This leads to un­pre­ce­den­ted in­va­si­ons of con­su­mer pri­va­cy. The high-re­so­lu­ti­on en­er­gy con­sump­ti­on data which are trans­mit­ted to the uti­li­ty com­pa­ny allow in­tru­si­ve iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on and mo­ni­to­ring of equip­ment wi­t­hin con­su­mers' homes (e. g., TV set, ref­ri­ge­ra­tor, toas­ter, and oven). Our re­se­arch shows that the ana­ly­sis of the hou­se­hold's elec­tri­ci­ty usage pro­fi­le at a 0.​5s² samp­le rate does re­veal what chan­nel the TV set in the hou­se­hold was dis­play­ing. It is also pos­si­ble to iden­ti­fy (co­py­right-pro­tec­ted) au­dio­vi­su­al con­tent in the power pro­fi­le that is dis­play­ed on a CRT, a Plas­ma dis­play TV or a LCD te­le­vi­si­on set with dy­na­mic back­ligh­ting. Our test re­sults in­di­ca­te that a 5 mi­nu­tes-chunk of con­se­cu­ti­ve view­ing wi­thout major in­ter­fe­rence by other ap­p­li­an­ces is suf­fi­ci­ent to iden­ti­fy the con­tent.

Our in­ves­ti­ga­ti­on also re­veals that the data trans­mit­ted via the In­ter­net by the smart meter are un­si­gned and un­en­cryp­ted.

Our tests were per­for­med on a sea­led, ope­ra­tio­nal smart meter used for elec­tri­ci­ty me­tering in a pri­va­te home in North Rhi­ne-West­pha­lia, Ger­ma­ny. Pa­ra­me­ters for other te­le­vi­si­on sets were ob­tained with an iden­ti­cal smart meter de­ploy­ed in a uni­ver­si­ty lab.

[Paper]

Tags: Au­dio­vi­su­al Con­tent, Data Pri­va­cy, Smart Grid, Smart Meter